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MEANING,	 UNDERSTANDING,	 AND	 KNOWING-WHAT:	
























Now,	 to	 offer	 a	 broadly	 coherent	 and	 focused	 philosophical	 analysis,	 I	 shall	
	neglect	 the	 metaphysical	 and	 presumably	 exotic	 aspects	 of	 the	 conception.	 My	
	overall	 purpose	 is	 to	 provide	 a	 rational	 reconstruction	 of	 Bhartṛhari’s	 empirical	









what,”	 I	 relate	pratibhā	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 knowing-what	 and	 show	why	 these	 two	
	notions	 are	 to	 be	 differentiated	 from	 knowing-that	 and	 knowing-how.	 I	 conclude	
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of	myriad	 things	 in	 the	world.3	However,	 I	 shall	not	discuss	such	metaphysical	or	
quasi-metaphysical	aspects	of	his	philosophy,	but	will	confine	my	discussion	to	the	
generally	empirical	dimension.










































































relation	 is	 not	 determinately	 cognizable;	 it	 lacks	 an	 independent	 form	 on	which	
words	can	alight,	because	it	depends	entirely	on	the	items	that	are	related	by	it.12	In	
addition,	given	the	entity-like	nature	of	nouns,	any	noun	used	to	signify	the	relation	

































contends	 that	 an	 intuitive	 meaning	 is	 divisionless	 and	 sequenceless,	 which	 may	
count	 as	 the	 second	 reason	 for	 the	 thesis.	 Even	 though	 the	meaning	 results	 from	
the	 combination	 of	 word	 meanings,	 it	 is	 actually	 a	 unitary,	 structureless	 whole	











































































latter	become	 the	 foci	while	being	deprived	of	 their	meaning	 just	as	 the	previous	
focus	is	relinquished.
Polanyi	applies	his	 theory	 to	various	 fields,	 including	 linguistic	practice.	“The	

















also	what	Bhartṛhari	 is	 driving	 at	when	he	 speaks	 of	 intuitive	meaning	being	be-
yond	 	analytical	 reflection.	However,	while	 Bhartṛhari	 stresses	 the	 indescribability	




case,	 Polanyi’s	 notion	of	 tacit	 integration	 and	his	 claim	 that	we know more  than 
we can say may	help	 in	elucidating	and	strengthening	Bhartṛhari’s	 ideas	on	 intui-
tive	meaning	and	understanding.	We	also	note	his	view	to	the	effect	that	all	kinds	














notion	of	pratibhā	 as	a	 flash	of	 indescribable	understanding	 such	 that	one	knows	
what	the	present	object	means	and	what	to	do	with	it.	Let	us	use	the	term	“intuitive	
understanding”	 or	 simply	 “intuition”	 for	 this	 notion.23	The	 notion	 can	 be	 applied	
across	a	wide	range,	although	it	is	difficult	to	ascertain	precisely	what	that	range	is.	
For	our	purposes,	and	on	the	basis	of	my	reading	of	the	passages	in	the	VP	that	con-
cern	 the	 notion,	 let	 us	 first	 delineate	 the	 general	 features	 of	pratibhā	 as	 intuitive	








content	cannot	be	 transmitted	 to	others	—	everyone	has	 to	acquire	 it	 through	 their	





pregnated	with	words.	However,	 he	 also	 has	 a	 notion	 of	 linguistic	 traces	 and	 of	




























occur	 through	 the	working	of	 linguistic	 traces,	which	bring	 forth	 inner	words	 that	












idea	 is	 unpersuasive	 to	 those	of	 us	who	have	no	belief	 in	 rebirth,	 and	Bhartṛhari	
would	be	left	nearly	only	with	nature	or	instinct	to	appeal	to	for	explaining	animals’	
spontaneous,	appropriate	activities.27



















Of	 course,	 an	 expert’s	 intuition	 generally	 gives	 rise	 to	 an	 intuitive	 judgment	
about	the	object	in	question,	and	she	may	manage	to	say	something	about	the	prob-





Both	sentence	understanding	and	expert	 intuition	are	 intellective	 in	character.	








discuss	pratibhā	 in	 relation	 to	skills	and	skillful	knowing,	although	he	does	assert	
that	all	crafts	are	based	on	an	awareness	that	is	linguistic	in	nature,	supposedly	refer-
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the	 intuitive	meaning.	Given	 the	 lack	of	 the	 second	and	 third	 features	delineated	




























Nevertheless,	what	 is	 the	 intuitive	meaning	 that	 figures	 in	 such	 sense	 experi-
ences?	The	meaning	is	perhaps	close	to	what	Michael	Dummett	has	chosen	to	call	
“proto-thought.”	 For	Dummett,	 the	 notion	 of	 proto-thought	 serves	 to	 account	 for	










The	 intuitive	meaning	 as	 the	 intentional	 content	 of	 intuitive	 understanding	 is	






















































































ing	what	an	experience	 is	 like	consists	 in	acquaintance	with	 the	experience,	and	
such	knowledge by acquaintance,	which	requires	only	a	maximally	direct	epistemic	
relation	 to	 the	experience,	“constitutes	a	 third	category	of	knowledge,	 irreducible	
to	factual	knowledge	or	knowing	how.”39	Further,	Eva-Maria	Jung	and	Albert	Newen	








































I	have	attempted	 to	explicate	Bhartṛhari’s	conception	of	pratibhā	 in	 its	 relation	 to	
the	notions	of	meaning,	understanding,	and	knowing.	A	pratibhā,	we	have	seen,	is	a	































propriate	 response	 to	make	here	and	now,	but	one	cannot	properly	verbalize	 the	
sense	—	not	to	say	the	reasons	for	it.	The	term	“intuitive	judgment”	would	then	be	a	
misnomer	 for	pratibhā.	Such	a	position	is	 indeed	unconventional.	Nevertheless,	 it	
accounts	for	the	 threshold	state	between	the	process	and	the	judgment	and	better	
captures	 the	 immediate,	 not	 yet	 propositionally	 structured	 character	 of	 the	 sud-
denly	arising	intuitive	experience.	(After	all,	it	takes	some	time	for	the	mind	to	form	


























(I	assume	that	Bhartṛhari	 is	 the	author	of	 the	Vṛtti.)	What	I	 take	to	be	the	act 
here	is	called	the	own form	(ātmarūpa)	in	the	verse.	Both	the	act	and	the	inten-


















abstracted	 or	 analyzed	 out	 of	 the	 sentence	meaning,	while	 being	 externally	
imposed.	Cf.	VP	2.445–446.




tory	 or	 visual	 imagery	—	that	what	 it	 is	 like	 to	 think	 a	 conscious	 thought	 (or	
	understand	a	sentence)	is	distinct	from	what	it	is	like	to	think	any	other	con-
scious	thought	(or	understand	any	other	sentence)	and	from	what	it	is	like	to	be	
in	 any	 other	 kind	 of	 conscious	 mental	 state.	Thus,	 there	 is	 something	 it	 is	
uniquely	like	to	apprehend	the	meaning	of	a	sentence.
11			–			See	Pitt	2004,	p.	31.
12			–			It	seems	for	Bhartṛhari	 that	a	thing	is	directly	and	properly	expressible	if	 it	 is	
independent	 in	 the	 sense	of	being	determinately	cognizable	and	 is	qualified	

































20			–			Polanyi	 1958,	 pp.	 62–63,	 87–93;	 Polanyi	 1959,	 pp.	 44–46;	 Polanyi	 1969,	
pp.	123–127,	132.
21			–			Cf.	 Polanyi	 1958,	 pp.	 87–93.	 Polanyi	 states	 on	 p.	 90:	 “by	 acquiring	 a	 skill,	
whether	muscular	or	intellectual,	we	achieve	an	understanding	which	we	can-














26			–			See	 the	Commentary	 on	VP	 1.129,	 131–132.	 Roughly,	 articulate	words	 are	
	inner,	unspoken	words	that	can	properly	be	articulated	as	audible	words,	while	
inarticulate	words	cannot.	For	Bhartṛhari,	thinking	amounts	to	an	inner	silent	










































on	 knowledge	 we	 have	 of	 our	 actions	 and	 is	 therefore	 not	 very	 pertinent	
here.
41			–			If,	 as	 Subramania	 Iyer	 holds	 (1982,	 p.	 54),	pratibhā	 takes	place	all  the  time 
in	us,	it	would	often	remain	only	implicit	and	subconscious,	and	yet	probably	
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